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Abstract 
This article looks back at Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] twenty years on.  It 
examines the ways in which the legal arguments of 
unconstitutional constitutional amendment were 
constructed by the counsels of the appellants and 
how the Justices ruled accordingly.  The main text 
of the Constitution said nothing about the exercise 
of constitutional amending power, meaning that it 
was being misused by the National Assembly—
posing a challenge to Taiwan’s political taboo on 
the extension of terms of office.  The disputed 
constitutional amendments were therefore struck 
down by the Justices as the guardians of the 
constitution, thereby founding the principle of 
limited constitutional amending power in Taiwan. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] represents a 
milestone in the legal history of Taiwan.  It proclaimed the Fifth 
Amendment of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the 
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Republic of China1 as the unconstitutional constitutional amendment2  
preventing the exercise of the constitutional amending power from 
“[bringing] down the constitutional normative order in its entirety”3 
when the main text of the Constitution4 was silent.  The Interpretation 
was filed by Hau Lung-Pin and Cheng Pao-Ching on October 28, 
1999, and by Hung Chao-Nan on November 18, 1999.5  The Justices 
heard the case on November 26, 1999, 6  and expeditiously 
promulgated their decision on March 24, 2000.7 
Unlike the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz),8 there was (and 
is) “[n]o eternity clause in the Constitution”9 of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan).  Consequently, the legal limitations of Taiwan’s 
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1 MINGUO XIANFA amend. (民國憲法增修條文) [Additional Articles of the 
Constitution of the Republic of China] (1999) (Taiwan). 
2 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
499] (2000) [hereinafter Shizi No. 499 Jieshi]. 
3 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
499] (2000) (Official translation) [hereinafter Shizi No. 499 Jieshi Official 
Translation]. 
4 MINGUO XIANFA (民國憲法) [Constitution of the Republic of China] (Adopted 
on Dec. 25, 1946, by the Constituent National Assembly convened in Nanking; 
promulgated by the Nationalist Government on Jan. 1, 1947; entered into force on 
Dec. 25, 1947) (Taiwan). 
5 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI YIJIANSHU CHAOBENDENG WENJIAN (釋字第 499 號解釋
意見書抄本等文件) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 Appendix] (2000) 
[hereinafter Judicial Yuan Interpretation]. 
6 JUDICIAL YUAN, CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, R.O.C., 
http://cons.judicial.gov.tw/jcc/zh-tw/categories/milestonelist/y21lmta1 
[https://perma.cc/9JQT-CD6P] (last visited Aug. 16, 2020). 
7 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2. 
8 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], § 79 ¶3, translation at  http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/PBP4-5G3S] (1949). 
9 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3, at ¶ 9. 
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constitutional amending power remained open to argument. 10  
However, the Justices ruled in accordance with the German theory of 
limited constitutional amending power 11  originated by Carl 
Schmitt,12 holding that some constitutional provisions “are [not] open 
to change through constitutional amendment,” 13  because such 
provisions—despite not being explicitly stated—“are integral to the 
essential nature of the Constitution and underpin the constitutional 
normative order.” 14   Any constitutional amendment which 
contradicts these provisions is therefore considered an 
unconstitutional constitutional amendment.15 
Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment of the Additional Articles 
of the Constitution of the Republic of China 16  was considered 
unconstitutional for three main reasons: that it violated the principles 
of popular sovereignty,17  due process,18  and the nemo dat rule.19  
However, what really angered Taiwanese citizens20 was the extension 
of the terms of office of the members of the National Assembly by 
two years and forty-two days,21 and of the members of the Legislative 
Yuan by five months.22  The Chinese political tradition of lifelong 
 
10 See, e.g., JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Tseng, H., 
dissenting). 
11 See generally AOIFE O’DONOGHUE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISATION 54–86 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014). 
12 CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE [CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY] 75–87 
(Duncker & Humblot 1928); see also ULRICH K. PREUß, CARL SCHMITT AND THE 
WEIMAR CONSTITUTION, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CARL SCHMITT 477–479 
(Jens Meierhenrich & Oliver Simons eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2016). 
13 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 MINGUO XIANFA amend. (民國憲法增修條文) [Additional Articles of the 
Constitution of the Republic of China] (1999) (Taiwan). 
17 See generally DANIEL LESSARD LEVIN, REPRESENTING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: 
THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE 1–194 (State Univ. New 
York Press, 1999). 
18 See generally DENNIS D. RILEY & BRYAN E. BROPHY-BAERMANN, 
BUREAUCRACY AND THE POLICY PROCESS: KEEPING THE PROMISES 298 (Rowman 
& Littlefield 2006) (indicating that “[b]y definition, due process is a matter of 
procedure”). 
19 See generally ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 790 (Cavendish 
Publishing, 4th ed. 2005). 
20 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
21 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan). 
22 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 4 (1999) (Taiwan). 
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tenure23 was already a political taboo in Taiwan, and it had been since 
the legendary Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], which 
stated that no one could extend any term of office for any reason from 
this point onwards, unless the country was once again put into a state 
of emergency.24 
II. HISTORICAL INSIGHTS 
The Fifth Amendment of the Additional Articles of the 
Constitution of the Republic of China was revised by the National 
Assembly on September 3, 1999 and promulgated by the President 
on September 15, 1999.25  However, this Amendment was a surprise 
to Taiwanese citizens, because it comprised an extension of the terms 
of office of members of the National Assembly by two years and 
forty-two days,26 and of members of the Legislative Yuan by five 
months.27  Furthermore, it transformed the role of members of the 
National Assembly from representatives of the people 28  to 
representatives of political parties, 29  apportioning the seats of 
members of the new National Assembly only in accordance with the 
“votes that the candidates nominated by each political party and all 
the independent candidates receive in the parallel election for the 
Members of the Legislative Yuan.” 30   In other words, the Fifth 
Amendment came as a political, legal and constitutional shock to the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) as a young democracy at the time.  Nigel 
N.T. Li, who was one of the participants in this historical event 
 
23 MEIRU LIU, INTELLECTUAL DISSIDENTS IN CHINA 58 (Edwin Mellen Press 
2001) (indicating that the Chinese “traditional rule [was] lifetime tenure for the 
ruler”). 
24 Compare SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI (釋字第 31號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No. 31] (1954), with SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI (釋字第 261號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 261] (1990), and SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) 
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000). 
25 MINGUO XIANFA amend. (民國憲法增修條文) [Additional Articles of the 
Constitution of the Republic of China] (1999) (Taiwan). 
26 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan). 
27 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 4 (1999) (Taiwan). 
28 Compare MINGUO XIANFA §§ 25–34 (1947) (Taiwan), with MINGUO XIANFA 
amend. § 1 (1997) (Taiwan). 
29 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan). 
30 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3, ¶ 10; see also 
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan). 
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concluded in his constitutional law textbook that the Amendment 
provided an opportunity to consider the merits of democratism and 
constitutionalism 31  through the event and its subsequent judicial 
review,32 i.e., Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000].  Li stated 
that: 
This review determined the limits of constitutional 
amending power whilst enlightening us to ponder two 
fundamental questions regarding democratism and 
constitutionalism:  How to prevent the majority from 
becoming tyrannical in the name of democracy, [i.e. 
the tyranny of the majority], and how to deter 
representatives from betraying the electorate. 33 —
Nigel N.T. Li (2007) 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] answered both 
questions.  In terms of democratism, the Interpretation declared that 
“[s]ome constitutional provisions are integral to the essential nature 
of the Constitution and underpin the constitutional normative order.  
If such provisions are open to change through constitutional 
amendment, adoption of such constitutional amendments would 
bring down the constitutional normative order in its entirety.”34  And 
in terms of constitutionalism, it declared that “the legitimacy of 
representative democracy lies in the adherence of elected political 
representatives to their social contract with the electorate.  Its cardinal 
principle is that the new election must take place at the end of the 
fixed electoral term.”35  In other words, the Justices in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] were warning the National Assembly 
of the limits of democracy, stating that “a democratic decision . . . 
 
31 Nigel N.T. Li’s original phrasing is “democratism and republicanism.”  
However, Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung, as a mentor of Li, referred to the same concept 
using the phrase “democratism and constitutionalism” in his concurring opinion.  
In order to avoid misconstruction, the phrase “democratism and 
constitutionalism” is therefore chosen. 
32 See generally NIGEL N.T. LI, AN LI XIAN FA I: XIAN FA YUAN LI YU JI BEN 
REN QUAN GAI LUN [CONSTITUTIONAL CASE STUDIES I: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS] 91–100 (San Min Books 2007). 
33 Id. at 97 (Authors’ translation). 
34 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3. 
35 Id. 
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cannot derogate or even destroy democratism per se.”36  “This is what 
is called the problem of tyranny of the majority,”37  under which 
democratic decisions are “so unjust that they undermine the 
legitimacy of democracy.”38  However, the Justices also reaffirmed 
the importance of democracy for the performance of 
constitutionalism, stating that “constitutionalism is only a piece of 
decoration . . . unless and until it embraces democracy.”39  This is the 
problem of constitutionalism, under which representative democracy 
is a necessity, but “[m]en of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or 
of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, 
first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the 
people.”40  Essentially, this means that some decisions cannot be 
made by majority vote,41 and constitutional safeguards against the 
representatives’ betrayal are indispensable too.42 
Perhaps Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] shows 
how impractical it is of a young democracy attempts to constrain its 
legislative or constitutional amending power only through political 
means.43  “Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it 
chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human 
rights . . . .  The constraints upon its exercise by Parliament are 
ultimately political, not legal.”44  Even if we consider that political 
constraint works perfectly in the United Kingdom, it is totally 
 
36 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation). 
37 THOMAS CHRISTIANO, INTRODUCTION, IN PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY: AN 
ANTHOLOGY 10 (Thomas Christiano ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003). 
38 Id. 
39 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation). 
40 JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST: NO.10, in THE FEDERALIST 47 (George W. 
Carey & James McClellan eds., Liberty Fund 2001) (1788). 
41 See generally THOMAS CHRISTIANO, INTRODUCTION, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 10–12 (Thomas Christiano ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2003). 
42 See generally JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST: NO.10, in THE FEDERALIST 
47 (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., Liberty Fund 2001) (1788). 
43 Compare ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 3–4 (8th ed., Macmillan 1915), with R v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(Lord Hoffmann elaborating the constraints upon legislative power shall be 
“political, not legal”). 
44 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 
(appeal taken from Eng.) 
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impractical in Taiwan.  Instead, Carl Schmitt’s theory45 of limited 
constitutional amending power46 is indispensable.  And this was the 
lesson the citizens of Taiwan learned from Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499 [2000]—no politics should lie beyond the 
reach of judicial review, i.e., the judicialisation of politics47 or mega-
politics.48 
When looking back on Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 
[2000] in its twentieth anniversary year, it is no exaggeration to say 
that the hard work of at least three generations brought an end to the 
Chinese political tradition of lifelong tenure.49  The Interpretation set 
a milestone marking Taiwan’s progress towards democratisation and 
constitutionalisation, because no politician in this country dare to 
extend his or her term of office from that point onward.  In all truth, 
it was unlikely that Taiwanese citizens fully understood the theory of 
limited constitutional amending power,50 or the principles of popular 
sovereignty51 and due process.52  However, it is a matter of record 
that citizens were angered by the National Assembly’s decision to 
self-extend of the term of office,53 albeit with limited knowledge of 
the nemo dat rule.54  If the members of the National Assembly could 
extend their term of office again,55 it would be no different from the 
restoration of Chinese political tradition. 
Forty-six years before Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 
[2000], first generation Justices ruled that “our state has been 
undergoing a severe calamity, which makes re-election of the second 
 
45 SCHMITT, supra note 12, at 75–87; see also PREUß, supra note 12, at 477–479. 
46 See generally O’DONOGHUE, supra note 11, at 54–86. 
47 RAN HIRSCHL, THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 253–274 (Robert E. Goodin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
2011). 
48 Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political 
Courts, 11 ANNU. REV. POLITICAL SCI. 93, 93–118 (2008). 
49 LIU, supra note 23, at 58 (indicating that the Chinese “traditional rule [was] 
lifetime tenure for the ruler”). 
50 See generally O’DONOGHUE, supra note 11, at 54–86. 
51 See generally LEVIN, supra note 17, at 1–194. 
52 See RILEY & BROPHY-BAERMANN, supra note 18, at 298 (indicating that “[b]y 
definition, due process is a matter of procedure”). 
53 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
54 See generally HUDSON, supra note 19, at 790. 
55 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan). 
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term of both Yuans de facto impossible.”56  Hence, all of the first-
term members of Congress “shall continue to exercise their respective 
powers” 57  before new members of both chambers “are elected, 
convene and are convoked in accordance with the laws.”58   This 
decision was made in 1954, during the Cold War.59  It was at this time 
that the Government of the Republic of China “continued to declare 
its intention to retake mainland China” 60  after state secession in 
1949, 61  asserting its constitutional legitimacy to represent all of 
China. 62   Against such a background, the Justices “came to this 
decision pragmatically: compared to having no legislators 
representing the entire China, it would be wiser to retain the old 
one.”63  However, “the decision offered further hints at the National 
Assembly’s desire for legislative power expansion,”64 granting de 
facto lifelong tenure to members of Congress before national 
reunification.65 
Twenty-three years before Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
499 [2000], members of the National Assembly with de facto lifelong 
tenure attempted to transform the de facto lifelong tenure granted by 
the Justices in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] into the de 
jure lifelong tenure according to the Temporary Provisions of the 
Constitution. 66   This is laid out in Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
 
56 SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI (釋字第 31號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 31] 
(1954) (Official translation). 
57 Id. (Official translation). 
58 Id. (Official translation). 
59 See generally DENNY ROY, TAIWAN: A POLITICAL HISTORY 105–151 (Cornell 
Univ. Press, 2003). 
60 LARS SCHERNIKAU, ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COAL TRADE: WHY 
COAL CONTINUES TO POWER THE WORLD 191 (Springer, 2nd ed. 2016). 
61 See generally MICHAEL DILLON, CHINA: A MODERN HISTORY 228–255 (I.B. 
Tauris 2012). 
62 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 
1451 (David S. Clark ed., SAGE Publications 2007) (indicating that “[i]n 1972, 
the United Nations (UN) rejected the Taiwan government’s claim to represent 
China in favor of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), governed by the Chinese 
Communist Party”). 
63 DAVID K.C. HUANG, JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IN TAIWAN: STRATEGIC MODELS 
AND THE JUDICIAL YUAN, 1990–1999 237 (GRIN 2019) (2016). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 236–238. 
66 Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for 
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion § 6II (1948/1972) (Adopted on Apr. 18, 
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No.150 [1977],67 but Justices of the second generation frustrated the 
political attempts of the National Assembly, holding that 
“[p]aragraph 6 of the Temporary Provisions Effective During the 
Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist 
Rebellion does not alter the term of elected central representatives 
under the Constitution.”68   In other words, members of Congress 
were judicially allowed to “continue to exercise their respective 
powers”69 only because “there were no vacancies to fill.”70  The de 
facto lifelong tenure was simply a pis aller in the eyes of the Justices, 
and the demand for de jure lifelong tenure was never a possibility.71 
Ten years before Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000], 
members of Congress with de facto lifelong tenure were dismissed 
by the Justices of the second generation in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990] on the basis of clausula rebus sic 
stantibus.72   This judicial decision opened the gate for Taiwan’s 
peaceful democratisation,73 which was aimed at ending the Chinese 
political tradition of lifelong tenure74 in Taiwan, under which the 
Government was ordered that it “[should] schedule, in due course, a 
nationwide election of the next members of Congress.” 75   The 
Justices also ordered that “those members of the First Congress who 
have not been re-elected shall cease exercising their powers no later 
than December 31, 1991.”76  The Justices ruled that: 
[P]eriodic election of members of Congress is a sine 
qua non to reflect the will of the people and implement 
 
1948 by the National Assembly; entered into force on May 10, 1948; abolished on 
May 1, 1991 by the President in line with the constitutional court order issued by 
the Judicial Yuan in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 261 [1990]). 
67 See generally HUANG, supra note 63, at 238–239. 
68 SHIZI NO. 150 JIESHI (釋字第 150號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
150] (1977) (Official translation). 
69 SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI, supra note 56 (Official translation). 
70 SHIZI NO. 150 JIESHI, supra note 68, at ¶ 2 (Official translation). 
71 SHIZI NO.150 JIESHI, supra note 68. 
72 HUANG, supra note 63, at 245–247. 
73 See generally HUANG, supra note 63, at 221–262. 
74 LIU, supra note 23, at 58 (indicating that the Chinese “traditional rule [was] 
lifetime tenure for the ruler”). 
75 SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI (釋字第 261號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
261] (1990) (Official translation). 
76 Id. (Official translation). 
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constitutional democracy.  Neither J.Y. Interpretation 
No. 31, nor Article 28, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, 
nor Section 6, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Temporary 
Provisions Effective During the Period of National 
Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist 
Rebellion allow the members of the First Congress to 
exercise powers indefinitely.  None of these 
provisions was intended to change their terms of 
office or prohibit election of new members of 
Congress.77 
In a nutshell, Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] can 
be seen as the final instalment of the tetralogy of anti-lifelong tenure 
in Taiwan.  It summarises the hard work of at least three generations 
of Chinese (or Taiwanese) jurists. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
This article looks back at Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
499 [2000] from a perspective of twenty years.  It analyses the way 
on which the legal arguments of unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment were constructed by the appellants’ counsels and how the 
Justices ruled accordingly. 78   Unlike the German Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz), 79  the main characteristic of this case lies in the 
absence of an “eternity clause in the Constitution,”80 which meant 
that the case turned into a fierce debate on the spirit of the 
Constitution81 because the main text of the Constitution was (and still 
is) silent.  In other words, the merit of this case to the international 
world lies in its doctrinal debate over the issues of constitutional 
 
77 Id. (Official translation). 
78 Compare SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499] (2000), with SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI YIJIANSHU 
CHAOBENDENG WENJIAN (釋字第 499 號解釋意見書抄本等文件) [Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No. 499 Appendix] (2000). 
79 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], § 79 ¶3, translation at  http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/PBP4-5G3S] (1949). 
80 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3, at¶ 9. 
81 MINGUO XIANFA (民國憲法) [Constitution of the Republic of China] (Adopted 
on Dec. 25, 1946, by the Constituent National Assembly convened in Nanking; 
promulgated by the Nationalist Government on Jan. 1, 1947; entered into force on 
Dec. 25, 1947) (Taiwan). 
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amending power, popular sovereignty, due process and the nemo dat 
rule.  The political controversy behind this case, it is beyond the remit 
of this article, although it is worth considering separately. 
IV. HAU LUNG—PIN’S INSTRUMENT OF APPEAL 
The fundamental hypothesis of constitutionalism 
is that power tends to corrupt [and will always be 
used] abusively.  It would therefore be irrational to 
rely entirely on the self-restraint of the designated 
organ per se for our constitutional amendments.  
[If there is no legal limit to] constitutional 
amending power, [it will become] a power that can 
ruin the constitution to the extent that no remedy 
will be available. 82 —Nigel N.T. Li and Yeh 
Ching-Yuan (1999) 
The first instrument of appeal enshrined in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] was filed by Congressman Hau Lung-
Pin83 with Nigel N.T. Li,84 Esq. (as lead counsel) and Yeh Ching-
Yuan,85 Esq. (as counsel).86  It was submitted to the Judicial Yuan on 
October 28, 1999 with the signatures of 112 congressmen and 
congresswomen of the Legislative Yuan. 87   With the benefit of 
hindsight, it outweighs the other instruments of appeal because it is 
no exaggeration to state that the majority opinion of the Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] approved all of the principal assertions 
made in this instrument in line with the legal-constitutional theories 
provided therein.88 
 
82 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation). 
83 Id. 
84 LL.B. (Soochow University 1977), LL.M. (National Taiwan University 1980), 
and LL.M. (Harvard 1983). 
85 LL.B. (National Chengchi University 1994), LL.M. (National Taipei University 
1997), LL.M. (UPenn 2002), J.D. (UPenn 2004), and S.J.D. (UPenn 2005). 
86 TITAN ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW, http://www.titanlaw.com.tw/blog/?p=2458 
[https://perma.cc/U72F-H4VW] (last visited 2 February 2020). 
87 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
88 Compare SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499] (2000), with SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) 
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] App’x (2000). 
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The alma mater of Nigel N.T. Li is Harvard,89 whilst Yeh 
Ching-Yuan obtained his S.J.D. degree at the University of 
Pennsylvania in 2005.90  However, their argument was based on the 
German theory of limited constitutional amending power91 originated 
by Carl Schmitt,92 who asserted that no constitutional amendment 
should be deemed constitutional if it was incompatible with the 
fundamental framework 93  of the Constitution 94  because “the 
constitutional amending power is a constituted power.”95  This meant 
that according to Li and Yeh, if a constitutional amendment raises 
serious doubts about its constitutionality because of “manifest and 
gross flaws”96  (Gravitaets-bzw. Evidenztheorie 97 ), Carl Schmitt’s 
concept of the guardian of the constitution, 98  i.e., der Hüter der 
Verfassung,99 should be applied to render the amendment judicially 
reviewable100 (Prüfungsmaßstab101). 
 
89 LEE AND LI ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW, 
http://www.leeandli.com.tw/EN/Professions/3/116.htm [https://perma.cc/FE9X-
SJQF]. 
90 TITAN ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW, http://www.titanlaw.com.tw/blog/?page_id=634 
[https://perma.cc/KGM3-7SDB]. 
91 See generally O’DONOGHUE, supra note 11, at 54–86. 
92 SCHMITT, supra note 12, at 75–87; see also PREUß, supra note 12, at 477–479. 
93 Compare GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], § 79 ¶3, translation 
at  http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/PBP4-5G3S] (1949), with U.S. Const. art. V (1789), and 
MINGUO XIANFA § 1 (1947) (Taiwan). 
94 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
95 Id. (Authors’ translation); see also SCHMITT, supra note 12, at 91–99 (arguing 
that the constitutional amending power is a constituted power rather than a 
constituent power.  The former is the power originated in the constitution and the 
latter is the power that constitutes the constitution.  Hence, the former is limited 
by the constitution, but the latter is not). 
96 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3, at ¶ 1. 
97 SHIZI NO. 419 JIESHI (釋字第 419號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
419] ¶ 13 (1996). 
98 Compare CARL SCHMITT, DER HÜTER DER VERFASSUNG [THE GUARDIAN OF 
THE CONSTITUTION] 1–11 (Verlag Von J.C.B. Mohr 1931), with SHIZI NO. 499 
JIESHI YIJIANSHU CHAOBENDENG WENJIAN (釋字第 499 號解釋意見書抄本等文
件) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 Appendix] (2000). 
99 See DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS 
KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR 70–85 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997). 
100 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
101 See generally WU GENG, XIAN FA DE JIE SHI YU SHI YONG [THE 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION] 408–419 (on-file with 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss3/3
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Li and Yeh therefore asserted that it was unconstitutional to 
transform the National Assembly from a legislative chamber whose 
members should be elected by the people102  into a legislature in 
which seats were apportioned only according to the “votes that the 
candidates nominated by each political party and all the independent 
candidates receive[d] in the parallel election for the Members of the 
Legislative Yuan.” 103   They asserted that such a constitutional 
amendment would contradict the principle of popular sovereignty104 
provided by the Constitution,105 arguing that the principle must take 
priority over the amendment because the principle made up part of 
the fundamental framework of the Constitution.106  Accordingly, they 
pointed out that the amendment would transform the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) from “a democracy of the people” 107  into “a 
democracy of political parties,” 108  violating the constitutional 
equality clause109 by stopping people from voting for independent 
candidates henceforth.110 
Li and Yeh also recalled the legendary Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990], in which the Justices affirmed that 
“periodic election of members of Congress is a sine qua non to reflect 
the will of the people and implement constitutional democracy.”111  
Using Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] the Justices 
directly “[dismissed] the authoritarian congress and [forced] fresh 
and immediate elections,”112 and Li and Yeh asserted accordingly 
 
author) (2004) (Justice Wu Geng providing the standard of judicial review in 
Taiwan). 
102 Compare MINGUO XIANFA §§ 25–34 (1947) (Taiwan), with MINGUO XIANFA 
amend. § 1 (1997) (Taiwan). 
103 See MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan).  SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI 
OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3, at Reasoning ¶ 10.  JUDICIAL YUAN 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
104 See generally DANIEL LESSARD LEVIN, REPRESENTING POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE 1–194 
(State Univ. of New York Press 1999). 
105 MINGUO XIANFA § 2 (1947) (Taiwan). 
106 See MINGUO XIANFA §§ 1–2 (1947) (Taiwan).  JUDICIAL YUAN 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
107 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation). 
108 Id. (Authors’ translation). 
109 MINGUO XIANFA § 7 (1947) (Taiwan). 
110 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
111 SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI, supra note 75 (Official translation). 
112 HUANG, supra note 63, at 221. 
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that the terms of office of the members of Congress could not be self-
extended 113  unless the country “has been undergoing a severe 
calamity, which makes re-election . . . de facto impossible.”114  They 
asserted that it was unconstitutional to extend the terms of office of 
National Assembly members by two years and forty-two days115 and 
of the members of the Legislative Yuan by five months.116  If the 
members of the National Assembly were allowed to alter the lengths 
of their terms through a constitutional amendment117 this time, there 
would be no reason to prohibit them from doing it again,118 and the 
spirit of social contract developed by John Locke119 and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau120 would thus be ruined.121  Li and Yeh further asserted that 
Article 8 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution122 embodied 
the spirit of social contract, prohibiting the members of the National 
Assembly and the Legislative Yuan from increasing their 
remuneration or wages.123  “[I]ndividual regulations on increase of 
remuneration or pay shall go into effect starting with the subsequent 
National Assembly or Legislative Yuan.”124  Accordingly, Li and 
Yeh asserted that this rule—based upon the spirit of social contract—
must also apply to attempts to alter the term of office.125  They stated: 
The principle of democracy is based on the spirit of 
social contract, and the term of office provided by the 
Constitution specifies [our] people’s authorisation. 
 
113 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5; see also MINGUO XIANFA 
amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan). 
114 SHIZI NO.31 JIESHI, supra note 56. 
115 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5; see also MINGUO XIANFA 
amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan). 
116 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5; see also MINGUO XIANFA 
amend. § 4 (1999) (Taiwan). 
117 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan). 
118 See JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
119 See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT 1–401 
(Whitmore Fenn & C. Brown eds., 1821) (1690). 
120 See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 10–153 
(George D.H. Cole trans., Augustine Press 2018) (1923). 
121 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
122 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 8 (1997) (Taiwan). 
123 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5; see also MINGUO XIANFA 
amend. § 8 (1997) (Taiwan). 
124 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 8 (1997) (Taiwan) (Official translation). 
125 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss3/3
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Apart from in a state of emergency, under which it is 
necessary to de facto extend the term of office for the 
sake of [our] constitutionalism, no delegate shall have 
power to alter the authorisation without positive 
instruction by [our] people.126—Nigel N.T. Li and 
Yeh Ching-Yuan (1999) 
Li and Yeh finally asserted that the disputed constitutional 
amendments 127  were passed by the National Assembly in undue 
process.128  The second and third readings were both rigged by secret 
ballot, which violated the Self-Stipulated Rules of Assembly of 
1999.129  The Justices affirmed their general respect to the Legislative 
Yuan, 130  ruling that parliamentary privilege was applied under 
circumstances in which the bills were passed when “the 
congressmen/women were busy with ‘legislative brawling’ in the 
Legislative Yuan” 131  “unless it is in clear contravention to the 
Constitution.”132  Li and Yeh asserted that rigging a constitutional 
amendment by secret ballot was by its nature 133  “in clear 
contravention to the Constitution”134 because it constituted legislative 
unaccountability.135   They cited the concurring opinion of Justice 
David Souter in Nixon v. United States,136 in which Souter argued that 
“[n]ot all [judicial] interference is inappropriate or disrespectful”137 
depending on “how importunately the occasion demands the 
answer.”138  Accordingly, “if a secret ballot is allowed, how can the 
members of the National Assembly be accountable to the people in 
 
126 Id. (Authors’ translation). 
127 MINGUO XIANFA amend. §§ 1, 4 (1999) (Taiwan). 
128 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
129 Guomindahuiyishiguize (國民大會議事規則) [Rules of Assembly of the 
National Assembly] art. 38II (1948 & 1999). 
130 See generally SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI (釋字第 342號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 342] (1994). 
131 HUANG, supra note 63, at 291. 
132 SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 132 (Official translation); see also SHIZI NO. 
419 JIESHI, supra note 97. 
133 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
134 SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 132. 
135 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
136 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253 (1993) (Souter, D., concurring). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
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accordance with Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.401 [1996],”139 and 
why should the Justices show their general respect140 to the National 
Assembly in such an importunate occasion? 
V. CHENG PAO—CHING’S INSTRUMENTS OF 
APPEAL 
Three instruments of appeal were filed by Congressman 
Cheng Pao-Ching, 141  and according to Justice Sun Sen-Yen, 142 
Dennis T.C. Tang143 (who was to become a Justice in 2011) was the 
author.  The first instrument was co-signed by 79 congressmen and 
congresswomen of the Legislative Yuan, 144  and there were 80 
signatures for the second and third instruments.145  All of these were 
submitted to the Judicial Yuan on October 28, 1999.146  Meanwhile, 
it is interesting to note that Tang reminded the then Justices of the 
people’s anger (Min-Yuan) repeatedly throughout the instruments.147 
The first argument proposed by Dennis T.C. Tang was that 
fundamental rights and popular sovereignty set the legal boundary for 
constitutional amendments, although it was arguable whether the 
constitutional amending power should be legally limited or not.148  
Tang would have been surprised by Lord Hoffmann’s famous dictum: 
“Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental 
principles of human rights,” 149  because the model of unlimited 
constitutional amending power, including the British150 and Weimar 
 
139 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation). 
140 See generally SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 132. 
141 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
142 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Sun S-Y, partial concurring). 
143 LL.B. (National Taiwan University 1978), LL.M. (National Taiwan University 
1981), LL.M. (Harvard 1984), and S.J.D. (Tulane 1989). 
144 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 
(appeal taken from Eng.).  
150 See ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 3–4 (8th ed., Macmillan 1915). 
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German151 models, supported the idea that “[t]he constraints upon its 
exercise by Parliament are ultimately political, not legal.”152  In other 
words, Tang probably undervalued the gravity of unlimited 
constitutional amending power, but he was keenly aware of the 
importance of the core arguments of fundamental rights and popular 
sovereignty.153  Like Nigel N.T. Li and Yeh Ching-Yuan, he recalled 
the legendary Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], which 
asserted that periodical re-election was a fundamental right (the right 
to vote154) and the concretisation of popular sovereignty.155  As such, 
it was unconstitutional for the National Assembly to self-extended 
their term of office retrospectively.156 
Unlike Nigel N.T. Li and Yeh Ching-Yuan, Tang was not 
opposed to secret ballots 157  and offered no opinion about the 
transformation of the National Assembly. 158   But he was very 
sensitive to the concept of self-extending the term of office.159  His 
second argument was aimed at the Justices, persuading them into 
believing that judicial interference was the solution provided by the 
Constitution160 under such a scenario.  According to Tang, “apart 
from the Justices’ judicial review power over the legal boundary of 
constitutional amendments, no political power can constrain the 
National Assembly to power expansion, constitutional derogation 
and the destruction of liberal democracy in reality.”161  Hence, he 
asserted that “the Justices are the final guardians of [our] Constitution, 
with the sanctified responsibility of protecting the spirit of [our] 
Constitution,”162 and they “should not dismiss the case in accordance 
 
151 GERHARD ANSCHÜTZ, DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS VOM 11 
AUGUST 1919 [The Constitution of the German Reich from August 11, 1919] 
351–352 (Georg Stilke ed., 1929). 
152 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 
(appeal taken from Eng.).  
153 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
154 MINGUO XIANFA § 17 (1947) (Taiwan). 
155 MINGUO XIANFA §§ 1–2 (1947) (Taiwan).  JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, 
supra note 5. 
156 Id. 
157 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Sun S-Y, partial concurring). 
158 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
159 Id. 
160 MINGUO XIANFA §§ 171–173 (1947) (Taiwan). 
161 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation). 
162 Id. (Authors’ translation). 
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with the political question doctrine or gerichtsfreier Hoheitsakt.”163  
In a nutshell, his argument covered the notion of judicial 
supremacy164 or judicialisation of politics,165 supporting the Justices 
to become substitute lawmakers, i.e., Ersatzgesetzgeber.166 
VI. HUNG CHAO—NAN’S INSTRUMENT OF 
APPEAL 
A democratic decision shall be respected even 
though it is inappropriate or ineffective, but it 
cannot derogate or even destroy democratism per 
se.167—Su Yeong-Chin (1999) 
The final instrument of appeal enshrined in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] was filed by Congressman Hung Chao-
Nan, 168  and was written by Su Yeong-Chin, 169  who went on to 
become Vice-Chief Justice in 2010.  The instrument was delivered to 
the Judicial Yuan on November 18, 1999,170 bearing the signatures of 
102 congressmen and congresswomen of the Legislative Yuan.171  
Public opposition (Min-Zhong-Fan-Dui) was also mentioned in this 
instrument of appeal.172 
The first argument proposed by Su Yeong-Chin was based 
upon the nemo dat rule, i.e., nemo dat quod non habet,173 by which 
 
163 Id. (Authors’ translation). 
164 See generally HUANG, supra note 63, at 33–385. 
165 See generally Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Politics, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 253–274 (Robert E. Goodin ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2011). 
166 See generally Christine Landfried, The Judicialization of Politics in Germany, 
15(2) INT. POL.SCI. REV. 113, 113–124 (1994). 
167 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation). 
168 Id. 
169 LL.B. (National Taiwan University 1972) and Dr.Iur. (München 1981). 
170 This last submission represented the general attitude of the 
congressmen/women of the Legislative Yuan of the ruling Nationalist Party of 
China.  Perhaps this is the reason why it was submitted 21 days later than the 
other submissions.  JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 See generally ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 790 (4th ed., 
Cavendish Publishing 2005). 
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he asserted174 that it was unconstitutional for the National Assembly 
to self-extend their term of office because “one cannot give that 
which one does not have.”175  Applying this English legal rule implies 
the notion of limited constitutional amending power 176  per se.  
However, the merit of the nemo dat argument lies in Su’s excellent 
interpretation of the legitimacy of the ruling power.177  He stated: 
The spirit of democracy indicates that “the ruler shall 
rule by the consent of the ruled.”  Election, therefore, 
is the necessary procedure of collective trust, 
authorising the legitimacy of exercising state power to 
the ruler. The purpose of re-election when the term of 
office is due is to reconfirm the democratic legitimacy 
of the ruler.178—Su Yeong-Chin (1999) 
In other words, Su argued that the legitimacy of the members 
of the National Assembly in attempting to exercise constitutional 
amending powers was rooted in holding periodical elections of the 
chamber at the due time.  The National Assembly could not therefore 
extend their term of office by two years and forty-two days, 179 
because “one cannot give that which one does not have.”180   Su 
asserted that the legendary Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 
[1990] affirmed the nemo dat rule,181  “drawing the line between 
democracy and autocracy.”182 
The second argument proposed by Su was based upon popular 
sovereignty,183 by which he asserted that it was unconstitutional to 
hold secret ballots for constitutional amendments, because the 
process would deliberately disconnect the people from their 
 
174 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
175 HUDSON, supra note 173, at 790. 
176 See generally O’DONOGHUE, supra note 11, at 54–86. 
177 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
178 Id. (Authors’ translation). 
179 Id. 
180 HUDSON, supra note 173, at 790. 
181 Compare ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 790 (4th ed., Cavendish 
Publishing 2005), with SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI YIJIANSHU CHAOBENDENG WENJIAN 
(釋字第 499 號解釋意見書抄本等文件) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 
Appendix] (2000); see also SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI, supra note 75. 
182 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation). 
183 MINGUO XIANFA §§ 1–2 (1947) (Taiwan). 
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representatives. 184   “Popular sovereignty would become 
parliamentary sovereignty if a constitutional amendment could be 
passed by secret ballot.  Regardless of the bona fide motive as well 
as the desirable outcome, [the transformation] itself is incompatible 
with the framework of the Constitution.” 185   Su argued that the 
disputed constitutional amendments passed by the National 
Assembly in undue process186  were judicially reviewable in toto, 
because their amending “procedures contained manifest and gross 
flaws”187 “which could otherwise never be redressed at all.”188 
Su’s final argument was that liberal democratism provided the 
boundary for constitutional amendments, which reflected the 
commonly held opinion of legal-constitutional scholarship in 
Taiwan.189  However, it is interesting to note that he—as a legal 
counsel of the congressmen and congresswomen of the Legislative 
Yuan from the ruling Nationalist Party of China—expressed no 
opinion about the transformation of the National Assembly.190  It is 
therefore puzzling as to how Su defined popular sovereignty and 
liberal democratism if the transformation of the National Assembly 
was allowed.191  Perhaps, as a legal counsel, he was not in a good 
position to illustrate his opinion freely.  Consequently, he chose to 
make implications instead, reaffirming liberal democratism as the 
fundamental framework of the Constitution, whether or not the ban 
against altering it was written in the Constitution.192 
VII. JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION NO. 499 
[2000] 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] was a typical 
separation of powers game.193  The Interpretation came about after 
 
184 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
185 Id. (Authors’ translation). 
186 MINGUO XIANFA amend. §§ 1, 4 (1999) (Taiwan). 
187 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3, at Reasoning ¶ 1. 
188 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. (Su Yeong-Chin arguing as to whether the “inappropriateness” of the 
transformation constituted a violation of the Constitution). 
192 Id. (Su Yeong-Chin elaborating the German concept of 
Verfassungsdurchbrechung). 
193 See generally HUANG, supra note 63, at 274–287. 
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differences between the Legislative Yuan (appellant organ) and the 
National Assembly (respondent organ) “in terms of allegations of 
unconstitutionality by the appellant organ, seeking a judicial decision 
that could constitutionally force the respondent organ to back down 
from its original position.”194  It was filed by Hau Lung-Pin (The New 
Party) and Cheng Pao-Ching (Democratic Progressive Party) on 
October 28, 1999,195 and by Hung Chao-Nan (Nationalist Party of 
China) on November 18, 1999.196  The en banc decision197 was heard 
by the Justices on November 26, 1999198 and promulgated on March 
24, 2000.199  According to Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng,200 the 
late Justice Wu Geng 201  was the main author representing the 
majority opinion. 202   Six judicial opinions were submitted, 
comprising two partial concurring opinions, 203  two concurring 
opinions,204 one concurring and partial dissenting opinion205 and one 
dissenting opinion.206  The case was a remarkable one in Taiwan’s 
legal history because the Justices struck down the Fifth Amendment 
of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of 
China.207  The Justices ruled that: 
 
194 Id. at 270. 
195 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
196 Id. 
197 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (recording the signatures of all the sixteen 
Justices). 
198 R.O.C JUDICIAL YUAN, http://cons.judicial.gov.tw/jcc/zh-
tw/categories/milestonelist/y21lmta1 [https://perma.cc/6P7R-QFDM] (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2020). 
199 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2. 
200 A.A. (Tainan Normal School 1956), LL.B. (National Taiwan University 1960), 
and Dr.Iur. (Heidelberg 1966). 
201 LL.B. (National Taiwan University 1962), M.A. (National Taiwan University 
1966), and Dr.Iur. (Wein 1977). 
202 See Weng Yueh-Sheng, Mian Huai Da Fa Guan Wu Meng Geng Xian Sheng 
[In Memory of the Late Justice Wu Geng], 22 ZHONG YAN YUAN FA XUE QI KAN 
[ACADEMIA SINICA LAW JOURNAL] i, iii (2018). 
203 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Lin Y-M & Sun S-Y, partial concurring). 
204 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Su J-H & Lai I-J, concurring). 
205 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Chen C-N, concurring and partial 
dissenting). 
206 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Tseng H-S, dissenting). 
207 MINGUO XIANFA amend. §§ 1, 4, 9–10 (1999) (Taiwan). 
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[T]he disputed Articles 1, 4, 9, and 10 of the 
Additional Articles shall be null and void from the 
date of announcement of this Interpretation.  The 
Additional Articles promulgated on July 21, 1997, 
shall continue to apply.  It is so ordered.208 
VIII. DECISION ONE: DER HÜTER DER 
VERFASSUNG 
At the intersection of constitutionalism and 
democratism, no freedom (or power) shall be de 
jure unlimited.  When the Constitution is amended, 
it shall comply with democratism per se.  However, 
this does not mean that it is free from the limit of 
constitutionalism. 209 —Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung 
(2000) 
Whether a constitutional amendment is judicially 
reviewable 210  is always a theoretical dilemma, 211  and the first 
decision made by the majority of the Justices in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] was that the Justices are empowered 
by the Constitution 212  not only to interpret the Constitution in 
general213 but also to govern “the enforcement and amendment of the 
Constitution.”214  This meant that “[d]oubts or ambiguities arising 
therefrom are also subject to interpretation by [the Judicial Yuan].”215  
It is interesting to note that the Justices recalled Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990] through a contradictory proposition,216 
 
208 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3. 
209 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Su J-H, concurring) (Authors’ translation). 
210 See generally KEMAL GÖZLER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 3–103 (Ekin Press 2008). 
211 Compare Sri Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar 
(and Other Cases) (1952) SCR 89 (India), with Kesavananda Bharati 
Sripadagalvaru and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr. (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India). 
212 MINGUO XIANFA § 173 (1947) (Taiwan). 
213 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 2. 
214 Id. (Official translation). 
215 Id. (Official translation). 
216 See generally B.P. BAIRAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO SYLLOGISTIC LOGIC: WITH 
SELECTED HISTORY, THEORIES AND READINGS IN WESTERN ETHICS 197 (Katha 
Publishing 2005). 
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suggesting that the National Assembly should not apply for judicial 
review when it demanded the Court’s authority217 and challenging the 
Court’s judicial review power when it did not want to be interfered 
with.218  The Justices ruled that: 
As indicated above, the Constitutional Court has 
jurisdiction over constitutional interpretation in cases 
of doubts or ambiguities arising with respect to the 
procedure of amendment.  The constitutionality of the 
internal procedures of the authority concerned, such as 
the scope of parliamentary autonomy and its limits, 
involves the choice of various standards of review by 
the Constitutional Court.219 
The above decision was obviously based upon Carl Schmitt’s 
concept of the guardian of the constitution,220  i.e., der Hüter der 
Verfassung. 221   Although this argument can be found on the 
instrument of appeal submitted by Nigel N.T. Li and Yeh Ching-
Yuan,222 the credit is probably not theirs, because it was the then 
Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng who introduced this concept into 
Taiwan.223  The main author of the majority opinion,224 Justice Wu 
Geng, was also a well-known expert on the scholarship of Schmitt.225  
Unlike the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), 226  there was “[n]o 
eternity clause in the Constitution” 227  of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan).  However, the Justices still ruled in line with the German 
 
217 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 2. 
218 Cf. id. 
219 Id. at ¶ 7 (Official translation). 
220 See generally CARL SCHMITT, DER HÜTER DER VERFASSUNG [THE GUARDIAN 
OF THE CONSTITUTION] 1–11 (Verlag Von J.C.B. Mohr 1931). 
221 See DYZENHAUS, supra note 99, at 70–85. 
222 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
223 See generally Weng Yueh-Sheng, Xian Fa Zhi Wei Hu Zhe [The Guardian of 
the Constitution], 17 XIAN ZHENG SI CHAO [THOUGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM] 
146, 146–148 (1972). 
224 See Weng, supra note 202, i, iii. 
225 See WU, supra note 101, at 607 (Yen Chueh-An sharing his opinion about the 
influence of Carl Schmitt upon Justice Wu Geng). 
226 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], § 79 ¶3, translation at  http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/PBP4-5G3S] (1949). 
227 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 9 (Official translation). 
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theory of limited constitutional amending power228 originated by Carl 
Schmitt229 and held that: 
[I]f a constitutional provision, which is integral to the 
essential nature of the Constitution and underpins the 
constitutional normative order, is open to change 
through a constitutional amendment, permitting such 
a constitutional amendment would bring down the 
constitutional normative order in its entirety.  Such a 
constitutional amendment in and of itself should be 
denied legitimacy . . . .  [I]n the event that a 
constitutional amendment contravenes the 
constitutional order of liberal democracy, as 
emanating from the said foundational principles, it 
betrays the trust of the people, shakes the foundation 
of the Constitution, and thus must be checked by other 
constitutional organs.  Such a check on the designated 
body that makes amendments is part of the self-
defense mechanism of the Constitution.230 
In other words, the majority opinion in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] had no intention of invalidating 
parliamentary privilege,231 but was instead designed to highlight the 
criterion of the abuse of legislative power in accordance with the 
principle of gravity defect control (Gravitaets-bzw. 
Evidenztheorie232).  The Justices therefore reminded the members of 
the National Assembly of their “oath of allegiance to the Constitution, 
whereby they are to be loyal to the Constitution,”233 lecturing them 
that “[c]onstitutional loyalty also applies when the National 
Assembly exercises its amending power.”234   This meant that the 
 
228 See generally O’DONOGHUE, supra note 11, at 54–86. 
229 SCHMITT, supra note 12, at 75–87; see also PREUß, supra note 12, at 477–479. 
230 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 9 (Official translation). 
231 Compare SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499] (2000), with SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI (釋字第 342號解釋) 
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 342] (1994), and SHIZI NO. 381 JIESHI (釋字第
381號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 381] (1995). 
232 SHIZI NO. 419 JIESHI, supra note 97, at Reasoning ¶ 13. 
233 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 9 (Official translation). 
234 Id. (Official translation). 
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Justices would not endorse all the legislative activities “[falling] 
within the scope of parliamentary autonomy, and thus … [avoiding] 
the legal effects of manifest and gross procedural flaws.”235  In the 
eyes of the Justices as the Guardians of the Constitution of the 
Republic of China,236 they would sustain the National Assembly’s 
legal claim for parliamentary privilege (or autonomy) when it “[deals] 
with a constitutional amendment bill . . . in conformity with the 
constitutional order of liberal democracy.”237 
The constitution is [not only] the supreme law of the 
land [. . . ] [but also] the law of politics by nature.238—
Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung (2000) 
The way in which the majority opinion in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] evaluated the political question 
doctrine239 was thus formulised.  The Justices would and could, if 
they choose,240 intervene in political questions.  The Constitution is 
“the law of politics by nature,”241 which meant that the Guardians of 
the Constitution of the Republic of China would not allow political 
decisions “[bringing] down the constitutional normative order in its 
entirety,” 242  although they would respect political decisions in 
general.243 
 
235 Id. at ¶ 7 (Official translation). 
236 See generally VINCENT SZE & ROBERT H.C. TSAI, THE GRAND JUSTICE’ ROLE 
IN PROCESS OF THE R.O.C. DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM, in THE REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA CONSTITUTIONAL COURT REPORTER: INTERPRETATIONS NO .1–233 
(1949–1988) 699–720 (ROC Judicial Yuan ed., ROC Judicial Yuan 2007). 
237 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 7 (Official translation). 
238 Id. (Su J-H, concurring) (Authors’ translation). 
239 See generally DAVID K.C. HUANG, THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE IN 
TAIWAN: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TAIWAN’S JUDICIAL REVIEW AND JUDICIAL 
YUAN INTERPRETATION NO. 328 [1993] 4–39 (GRIN 2019) (2012). 
240 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 7 (ruling that the 
constitutionality of politics, including parliamentary privilege, “involves the 
choice of various standards of review by the [Justices]”). 
241 Id. (Su J-H, concurring) (Authors’ translation). 
242 Id. (Official translation). 
243 Id.; see also SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 130; SHIZI NO. 381 JIESHI (釋字
第 381號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 381] (1995).  It is important to 
note that the Judicial Yuan has remained a very powerful court since the 1990s.  It 
even dismissed the authoritarian congress and opened the gate for Taiwan’s 
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Although they did not disagree with the majority opinion, 
Justices Su Jyun-Hsiung and Chen Chi-Nan were concerned about 
it.244  They both asserted that the Justices could behave much more 
respectfully towards the legislative power by ordering the National 
Assembly to re-amend the Constitution in accordance with Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000], instead of striking down 
disputed constitutional amendments arbitrarily.245  Their argument 
was that as the guardians of the constitution, the Justices could decide 
what was constitutional and what was not (constitutionalism), but 
they were not entitled to make political decisions (democratism).246  
This meant that the Justices could suspend any unconstitutional 
constitutional amendment, but not invalid it completely.247  Whilst 
the outcome may be the same, the attitude is very different. 
The only dissenting opinion in Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No. 499 [2000] was submitted by Justice Tseng Hua-Sun,248 who 
asserted that there was “[n]o eternity clause in the Constitution”249 of 
the Republic of China, and therefore he found no reason why the 
constitutional amending power was limited.250  He did not oppose 
Schmitt’s theory in general,251 but considered that it must be amended 
into the Constitution before being applied.252 
IX. DECISION TWO: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 
Our country had undergone the periods of party-
led military control and of party-led political 
tutelage since its establishment, and the ruling 
 
peaceful democratisation via the legendary Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 
[1990].  See generally HUANG, supra note 63, at 221–262. 
244 Compare SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499] (2000) (Su Jyun-Hsiung, concurring), with SHIZI NO. 499 
JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000) (Chen 
C-N, concurring and partial dissenting). 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Chen C-N, concurring and partial 
dissenting). 
248 Id. (Tseng H-S, dissenting). 
249 Id. at Reasoning ¶ 9 (Official translation). 
250 Id. (Tseng H-S, dissenting). 
251 SCHMITT, supra note 12, at 91–99. 
252 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Tseng H-S, dissenting). 
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political party and the Government were 
politically fused.  Hence, equality amongst all 
political parties is a distinctive doctrine embodied 
in the Constitution by our Pater Constitutio [. . . .]  
The demand for equality amongst all political 
parties includes not only its literal meaning but 
also the demand for equal rights to political 
participation amongst all independent 
candidates. 253 —Nigel N.T. Li and Yeh Ching-
Yuan (1999) 
Whether it is constitutional to transform the members of the 
National Assembly 254  from representatives of the people 255  to 
representatives of political parties,256 the majority of the Justices in 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] affirmed the principle of 
popular sovereignty 257  and declared this transformation 
unconstitutional.258  It is important to note that the Justices appeared 
impatient as they lectured the National Assembly that “[n]o such an 
electoral system can be found among advanced democracies.”259  In 
the eyes of the Justices as the Guardians of the Constitution, this 
unprecedented system was totally “incompatible with the protection 
of political rights under the Constitution” 260  because “individual 
independent candidates would not be elected based on their own ideas 
and policies pitched at the electors.”261  The Justices held that: 
Article 1 of the Additional Articles adopted by the 
Third National Assembly on September 4, 1999, 
stipulates that, from the Fourth National Assembly on, 
the seats of the Delegates shall be apportioned 
according to the popular votes that the candidates 
 
253 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation). 
254 Id. (asserting that the Republic of China would be transformed from “a 
democracy of the people” into “a democracy of political parties”). 
255 Compare MINGUO XIANFA §§ 25–34 (1947) (Taiwan), with MINGUO XIANFA 
amend. § 1 (1997) (Taiwan). 
256 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan). 
257 MINGUO XIANFA §§ 1, 2 (1947) (Taiwan). 
258 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2. 
259 Id. at Reasoning ¶ 10 (Official translation). 
260 Id. (Official translation). 
261 Id. (Official translation). 
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nominated by each political party and all the 
independent candidates receive in the parallel election 
for the Members of the Legislative Yuan, which 
differs from the National Assembly in function and 
competence.  The Delegates who are to be selected 
pursuant to the challenged apportionment method but 
not directly elected by the people, are merely the 
representatives appointed by respective political 
parties according to their share of seats in the 
Legislative Yuan. Accordingly, this amendment is 
incompatible with the spirit of Article 25 of the 
Constitution, which provides that the National 
Assembly, on behalf of the people, exercises 
sovereign rights.  It leads to a conflict between two 
constitutional provisions.  All the powers conferred by 
Article 1 of the Additional Articles are presupposed to 
be exercised by the Delegates elected by the people. 
Should the Delegates, selected pursuant to the 
challenged apportionment method, be allowed to 
exercise the powers of the said Article 1, the 
fundamental principles of constitutional democracy 
would be thereby violated.  Hence, the disputed 
Additional Article amending the method of election 
for the Delegates is incompatible with the 
constitutional order of liberal democracy.262 
The fundamental disagreement between the Justices and the 
National Assembly on this transformation lies only in what kind of 
decisions can and cannot be made democratically. For example, could 
a specific person be chosen to pay all the bills for the rest of the people 
democratically, i.e., as a tyranny of the majority?263  If the answer is 
no, how could the members of the National Assembly “merely 
representatives appointed by individual political parties, rather than 
representatives of the people”264 be allowed to “[exercise] sovereign 
 
262 Id. 
263 See generally DONALD L. BEAHM, CONCEPTIONS OF AND CORRECTIONS TO 
MAJORITARIAN TYRANNY 1–102 (Lexington Books 2002). 
264 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 10 (Official translation). 
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[powers] on behalf of the people”265  simply because the disputed 
constitutional amendment266 was passed democratically?267  In other 
words, could the decision to terminate democracy be legitimately 
made democratically, as Adolf Hitler’s Enabling Act of 1933, i.e., 
Das Ermächtigungsgesetz vom 24. März 1933,268 or the Coronation 
of Napoléon in 1804 were?269  In Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
499 [2000], the Justices said no and ruled: 
[I]f they continue to hold the following powers to alter 
the state territory (Article 4 of the Constitution), to 
elect the Vice President when the said office becomes 
vacant, to initiate a recall of the President or the Vice 
President, to vote on the impeachment of the President 
or the Vice President, to amend the Constitution, to 
approve constitutional amendment proposals put forth 
by the Legislative Yuan, and to confirm presidential 
appointments to the Judicial, Examination, and 
Control Yuans (Article 1 of the Additional Articles), 
which, by nature, should be vested in elected political 
representatives, it will not only result in evident 
normative conflict with Article 25 of the Constitution 
but also contravene the fundamental principle of the 
democratic state under Article 1 of the Constitution.  
Hence, the disputed Additional Articles concerning 
the allocation of the seats of the National Assembly 
are incompatible with the constitutional order of 
liberal democracy.270 
Justice Tseng Hua-Sun was the only Justice who approved.271  
He argued in line with the Preamble to the Additional Articles of the 
 
265 Id. (Official translation). 
266 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan). 
267 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2. 
268 Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich [Law to Remedy the 
Distress of People and Reich], Mar. 24, 1933, RGBL I at 141 (Ger.). 
269 See generally STEVEN ENGLUND, NAPOLEON: A POLITICAL LIFE 243–247 
(Harvard Univ. Press 2004). 
270 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
499] Reasoning ¶ 10 (2000) (Official translation). 
271 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Tseng H-S, dissenting). 
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Constitution of the Republic of China, 272  asserting that this 
transformation was “[t]o meet the requisites of the nation prior to 
national unification”273 only.274  He therefore blamed the majority 
opinion for pedantry and dogmatism.275 
X. DECISION THREE: NEMO DAT QUOD NON 
HABET 
In Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], 
[the Justices] went out of their way to reiterate the 
necessity of periodical re-elections to democracy 
and constitutionalism.  The truth expounded 
therefrom is self-evident to the extent that no 
additional interpretation is needed. 276 —Dennis 
T.C. Tang (1999) 
For historical reasons, 277  the idea of whether it was 
constitutional to extend the terms of office of the then members of the 
National Assembly by two years and forty-two days278 and of the then 
members of the Legislative Yuan by five months279 was a political 
taboo in Taiwan.280  Anyone who attempted to do such a thing would 
anger the public immediately.281  Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
499 [2000] was the last attempt in the Republic of China’s (Taiwan) 
political history to end the Chinese political tradition of life tenure 
forever.282  The Justices ruled: 
 
272 MINGUO XIANFA amend. pmbl. (1997) (Taiwan). 
273 Id. (Official translation). 
274 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Tseng H-S, dissenting). 
275 Id. 
276 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation). 
277 See generally SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI, supra note 56; SHIZI NO. 150 JIESHI, supra 
note 68; SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI, supra note 75. 
278 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan). 
279 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 4 (1999) (Taiwan). 
280 See generally HUANG, , supra note 63, at 221–262. 
281 E.g., JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Dennis T.C. Tang and 
Su Yeong-Chin stating public anger in their instruments of appeal respectively). 
282 The merit of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] is that if the 
extension of the term of office by two years and forty-two days was prohibited, 
there would have been no possibility of life tenure. 
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Pursuant to the principle of popular sovereignty, the 
power and authority of political representatives 
originate directly from the authorization of the people.  
Hence, the legitimacy of representative democracy 
lies in the adherence of elected political 
representatives to their social contract with the 
electorate.  Its cardinal principle is that the new 
election must take place at the end of the fixed 
electoral term unless just cause exists for not holding 
the election.  Failing that, representative democracy 
will be devoid of legitimacy.  J.Y. Interpretation No. 
261 held that “periodic election of members of 
Congress is a sine qua non to reflect the will of the 
people and implement constitutional democracy” to 
that effect.  The just cause for not holding the election 
alluded to above must be consistent with the holdings 
of J.Y. Interpretation No. 31, which stipulated, “The 
State has been undergoing a severe calamity, which 
has made the election of both the Second Legislative 
Yuan and the Second Control Yuan de facto 
impossible.”  In this case, no just cause for not holding 
re-elections can be found to justify the disputed 
extension of the terms of both the Third National 
Assembly and the Fourth Legislative Yuan.  Such an 
extension of the terms as effectuated by amending the 
said two provisions of the Additional Articles is not in 
conformity with the principle set out above.  
Furthermore, the self-extension of its own term by the 
Third National Assembly contravenes the principle of 
conflict of interest and is also incompatible with the 
constitutional order of liberal democracy.283 
It is important to note that the concept of a term of office 
contradicts the Chinese tradition originated in the mandate of 
heaven. 284   This tradition states that “rulers are empowered by 
 
283 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Official translation). 
284 See generally JOHN S. MAJOR & CONSTANCE A. COOK, ANCIENT CHINA: A 
HISTORY 121 (Routledge 2017). 
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Heaven,”285 which means that “[t]he leader enjoys lifelong tenure of 
office.”286  In Taiwan, the change to this was made by the Justices287 
in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], ruling per incuriam 
that the “periodic election of members of Congress is a sine qua non 
to reflect the will of the people and implement constitutional 
democracy.”288  So when the National Assembly extended its term of 
office,289 the act was politically construed as the restoration of the old 
tradition,290 which nobody accepted. If the National Assembly was 
permitted to extend its term this time, there would be no reason to 
prohibit its members from doing so again.291  The Justices therefore 
ruled that: 
The authority concerned further argues that the self-
extension of the term of office of the Third National 
Assembly is part of parliamentary reform [. . . ] 
parliamentary reform is always underpinned by 
structural or functional alteration.  Yet, in the disputed 
constitutional amendment, no change has been made 
as to the functions of the National Assembly.  Granted, 
changes in the method of election are part of structural 
alteration, but leaving aside the question as to whether 
the “derivative” type of proportional representation in 
the method of election of the National Assembly, 
which the disputed Additional Articles adopt in the 
place of the multi-member district electoral system, 
can be considered a genuine election, the change in the 
method of election of the National Assembly does not 
 
285 Id. 
286 ORVILLE SCHELL, MANDATE OF HEAVEN: THE LEGACY OF TIANANMEN 
SQUARE AND THE NEXT GENERATION OF CHINA’S LEADERS 69 (Simon & Schuster 
1994) (criticising the political leaders of the People’s Republic of China, China, 
although the situation was exactly the same in the Republic of China, Taiwan, 
before Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 261 [1990] was promulgated). 
287 See generally HUANG, supra note 63, at 221–262. 
288 SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI, supra note 75 (Official translation). 
289 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan); MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 4 
(1999) (Taiwan). 
290 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (showing that all the 
instruments of appeal referred to this argument and none of which read it without 
malice). 
291 Id. 
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necessarily lead to the disputed extension of the term.  
Even assuming the argument of the authority 
concerned that the disputed extension of the term will 
be conducive to parliamentary reform, there is no 
sound fit between the means and the end.292 
In other words, the Justices ruled in line with the nemo dat 
rule, i.e., nemo dat quod non habet,293 holding that no term of office 
could be extended because no state organisation was authorised by 
the Constitution to do so,294 unless the country was “undergoing a 
severe calamity, which makes re-election . . . de facto impossible.”295  
If the terms of office of the members of Congress had to be altered, 
the alteration “shall go into effect starting with the subsequent 
National Assembly or Legislative Yuan.”296  The Justices ruled: 
Article 8 of the Additional Articles provides: “The 
remuneration or pay of the Delegates of the National 
Assembly and the Members of the Legislative Yuan 
shall be regulated by statute.  Except for general 
annual adjustments, individual regulations on the 
increase of remuneration or pay shall go into effect 
starting with the subsequent National Assembly or 
Legislative Yuan.”  What this provision sets out is 
more than the principle that all political 
representatives shall avoid conflict of interest in 
carrying out their powers.  It a fortiori (a minore ad 
maius) stipulates: In light of the provision that the 
increase of remuneration or pay shall not apply until 
the subsequent National Assembly, the disputed self-
extension of the term of office is evidently 
incompatible with the principle of conflict of interest 
as set out in the Constitution.  In sum, the petitioners’ 
claim that the disputed extension of the term of the 
 
292 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 11 (Official translation). 
293 See generally ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 790 (4th ed., 
Cavendish Publishing 2005). 
294 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2. 
295 SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI, supra note 56 (Official translation). 
296 MINGUO XIANFA amend. §8 (1997) (Taiwan) (Official translation).  SHIZI NO. 
499 JIESHI, supra note 2. 
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Third National Assembly contravenes the 
constitutional order of liberal democracy and results 
in a normative conflict with Article 8 of the Additional 
Articles is sustained.297 
In Justice Chen Chi-Nan’s concurring and partial dissenting 
opinion, he argued that he would barely accept the disputed extension 
of the terms of office to be constitutional even if the people as the 
sovereigns were to ratify it in an ex post facto referendum. 298  
However, Justice Tseng Hua-Sun disapproved.299  He argued that the 
Justices had no power to review the quality of political decisions,300 
thus implying his preference over unlimited constitutional amending 
power.301  Furthermore, he considered the disputed extension of the 
terms of office to be part of the constitutional reform “[meeting] the 
requisites of the nation prior to national unification,”302 insofar as “it 
is difficult to conclude that it is incompatible with the 
Constitution.”303 
XI. DECISION FOUR: DUE PROCESS OF 
LEGISLATION 
As a constituted state organisation, the National 
Assembly is empowered to amend the 
Constitution [exclusively].  If the due process of 
amending the Constitution is determined by the 
main text of the Constitution only, no state power 
can check the National Assembly . . . . [And] if the 
National Assembly has the parliamentary 
privilege to violate its Self-Stipulated Rules of 
Assembly, it will put itself above the Constitution 
 
297 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 11 (2000) (Official 
translation). 
298 Id. (Chen C-N, concurring and partial dissenting). 
299 Id. (Tseng H-S, dissenting). 
300 Id. 
301 See generally R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms 
[2000] 2 AC 115 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Hoffmann asserting that “[t]he 
constraints upon . . . Parliament are ultimately political, not legal”). 
302 MINGUO XIANFA amend. pmbl. (1997) (Taiwan) (Official translation). 
303 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Tseng H-S, dissenting) (Authors’ 
translation). 
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and how can liberal democratism and 
constitutionalism be established under such a 
system?304—Nigel N.T. Li and Yeh Ching-Yuan 
(1999) 
Whether it was constitutional for the National Assembly to 
amend the Constitution by secret ballot, violating the Self-Stipulated 
Rules of Assembly of 1999,305  depends on how far the National 
Assembly can take its parliamentary privilege.306   In the Judicial 
Yuan’s previous decisions,307 the Justices respected the Congress’s308 
claim for parliamentary privilege 309  “unless it is in clear 
contravention to the Constitution.” 310   However, amending the 
Constitution by secret ballot represented a step too far, despite the 
fact that the main text of the Constitution was (and is) silent.311  The 
Justices ruled: 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. 
Constitutional amendment greatly affects the stability 
of the constitutional order and the welfare of the 
people and must be therefore faithfully carried out by 
the designated body in accordance with the principle 
of due process.  Constitutional amendment is a direct 
embodiment of popular sovereignty.  The amendment 
process requires openness and transparency, which 
enable democratic deliberation through rational 
communication and thus lay the foundation for the 
 
304 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation). 
305 GUOMINDAHUIYISHIGUIZE (國民大會議事規則) [Rules of Assembly of the 
National Assembly] art. § 38II (1948 & 1999). 
306 E.g., SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI , supra note 130; SHIZI NO. 381 JIESHI, supra note 
243. 
307 Id.; see also SHIZI NO. 419 JIESHI, supra note 97. 
308 See generally DAVID K.C. HUANG, SUN YAT-SEN AND THREE NOTABLE 
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS WITHIN THE CHINESE CONSTITUTIONS 20–22 (GRIN 
2019) (2009). 
309 Compare SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI (釋字第 342號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.342] (1994), with SHIZI NO. 381 JIESHI (釋字第 381號解釋) 
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 381] (1995). 
310 SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 130 (Official translation); see also SHIZI NO. 
419 JIESHI, supra note 97. 
311 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
456 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 15 
 
legitimacy of a constitutional state. [. . . ]  In the 
enactment and amendment of the Additional Articles, 
the process of the National Assembly shall be open 
and transparent.  It shall abide by Article 174 of the 
Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the 
National Assembly (hereinafter “Rules of the National 
Assembly”) so as to live up to the reasonable 
expectations and the trust of the people.  Accordingly, 
Article 38, Paragraph 2 of the Rules of the National 
Assembly concerning the secret ballot, as enacted by 
the National Assembly pursuant to Article 1, 
Paragraph 9 of the Additional Articles promulgated on 
August 1, 1994, shall be interpreted in a restrictive 
way, when applied to the readings of any 
constitutional amendment bill. [. . . ]  The amendment 
process for the disputed Additional Articles, which 
passed the third reading by the National Assembly on 
September 4, 1999, contravenes the principle of 
openness and transparency as set out above and is not 
in conformity with Article 38, Paragraph 2 of the 
Rules of the National Assembly.312 
Why was it unconstitutional to vote on a constitutional 
amendment by secret ballot?  To cope with this question when the 
main text of the constitution is silent, Anthony Stephen King 
provided a theoretical insight into the compass of constitutions: 
“Constitution . . . are never—to repeat, never—written down.  They 
might possibly in principle be written down, but in practice they never 
are.”313  That is, there are connotative and extensive314 constituents 
of constitution and “in practice they [are] never [written down].”315  
 
312 Id. (Official translation). 
313 ANTHONY S. KING, DOES THE UNITED KINGDOM STILL HAVE A 
CONSTITUTION? 3 (Sweet & Maxwell 2001). 
314 STÉPHANE P. DEMRI & EWA S. ORLOWSKA, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: 
STRUCTURE, INFERENCE, COMPLEXITY 15 (Springer 2002) (indicating that “[a] 
concept is determined by its extension (or denotation) and intension (or 
connotation).  The extension of a concept consists of the objects that are instances 
of this concept and the intension of a concept consists of the properties that are 
characteristic for the objects to which this concept applies”). 
315 KING, supra note 313, at 3. 
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Parliamentary privilege will not therefore be respected when its 
exercise “is in clear contravention to the Constitution,”316 even if the 
main text of the constitution is silent.317  The Justices ruled: 
Under the principle of popular sovereignty (Article 2 
of the Constitution), the communication processes in 
which public opinion is freely expressed and the will 
of the people is freely formed are the safeguard of 
popular sovereignty.  In other words, the exercise of 
popular sovereignty, when expressed in a 
constitutional system and its operation, requires 
openness and transparency, which enable democratic 
deliberation through rational communication and thus 
lay the foundation for the legitimacy of a 
constitutional state.  Considering that constitutional 
amendment is the direct embodiment of popular 
sovereignty, the fact that the National Assembly never 
used a secret ballot in the previous nine rounds of 
constitutional amendments, including during the 
enactment and amendment of the Temporary 
Provisions and the Additional Articles, speaks to the 
principle of popular sovereignty.  When the Delegates 
and their political parties are accountable to their 
constituents through such open and transparent 
amendment process, the constituents are able to hold 
them accountable through recall or re-election.  Thus, 
the provision for the secret ballot in Article 38, 
Paragraph 2 of the Rules of the National Assembly 
shall not be applied to voting on any constitutional 
amendment.  Not only must the readings for the 
adoption of a constitutional amendment comply with 
the Constitution strictly, but their procedures also 
need to conform to the constitutional order of liberal 
democracy (see J.Y. Interpretation No. 381).318 
 
316 SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 130 (Official translation). 
317 E.g., SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 130; SHIZI NO. 381 JIESHI , supra note 
243; SHIZI NO. 419 JIESHI, supra note 97; and SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2. 
318 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 5 (Official translation). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
458 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 15 
 
In the eyes of the Justices, “openness and transparency”319 
were “the foundation for the legitimacy of a constitutional state,”320 
because the Constitution 321  “explicitly provides that political 
representatives at all levels are recallable.” 322   “[T]he National 
Assembly, on behalf of the people, is the sole constitutional organ 
that has the power to amend the Constitution,” 323  and its 
constitutional amending power does not “require the approval of a 
bicameral parliament or the ratification of a parliamentary-adopted 
constitutional amendment bill by either a national referendum or state 
legislatures.” 324   In other words, if a secret ballot is deemed 
constitutional in the event of constitutional amendment under such a 
framework, popular sovereignty325 would become a dead letter.326  
Hence, the Justices ruled that “the use of a secret ballot is a manifest 
and gross [flaw].”327  Even though the main text of the Constitution 
is silent, the use of a secret ballot “is in clear contravention to the 
Constitution.”328 
However, there was a variety of different opinions amongst 
the Justices.  Justice Lin Young-Mou argued that the Justices might 
deliver a wrong message via the use of secret ballot, and that judicial 
interference could take place only when “manifest and gross flaws”329 
were found in constitutional amendments.330  He suggested a stricter 
and broader review. 331   Justice Lai In-Jaw argued that recalling 
Judicial Yuan’s previous decisions332 should not in itself lead to the 
conclusion that “the use of a secret ballot is a manifest and gross 
 
319 Id. 
320 Id. 
321 MINGUO XIANFA § 133 (1947) (Taiwan); see also SHIZI NO. 401 JIESHI (釋字
第 401號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 401] (1996). 
322 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 8 (Official translation). 
323 Id. Reasoning ¶ 5 (Official translation). 
324 Id. 
325 MINGUO XIANFA § 2 (1947) (Taiwan). 
326 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, Reasoning ¶¶ 5–6. 
327 Id. Reasoning ¶ 6 (Official translation). 
328 SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 130 (Official translation). 
329 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 1 (Official translation). 
330 Id. (Lin Y-M, partial concurring). 
331 Id. 
332 SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 130; SHIZI NO.381 JIESHI, supra note 243; 
SHIZI NO. 419 JIESHI, supra note 97. 
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[flaw],”333 and he also suggested a stricter and broader review.334  On 
the other hand, Justice Sun Sen-Yen argued against the idea that the 
use of a secret ballot is unconstitutional, citing the fact that the main 
text of the Constitution was silent in the subject.335  He argued that 
Dennis T.C. Tang as counsel admitted that “it is hard to say whether 
the use of a secret ballot in the event of constitutional amendment 
should be banned by the Constitution.”336  Tang’s acknowledgement 
was shared by Justices Su Jyun-Hsiung 337  and Chen Chi-Nan,338 
despite the fact that Su upheld the principle of “openness and 
transparency”339 unquestionably.340 
XII. CONCLUSION 
Both authors of this article were witnesses to the Fifth 
Amendment of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the 
Republic of China341 and the following Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No. 499 [2000], although one of the authors was only a law school 
student at the time, whose law school was located next to the chamber 
of the National Assembly.  As Dennis T.C. Tang and Su Yeong-Chin 
outlined in their instruments of appeal342 respectively, both authors 
witnessed the anger of the public (Tang: Min-Yuan; Su: Min-Zhong-
Fan-Dui343) towards the National Assembly’s self-extension of its 
term of office.344  Of course the National Assembly did more than 
this, but it was this that really angered the Taiwanese citizens345 the 
most in political terms. 
 
333 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 6 (2000) (Official 
translation). 
334 Id. (Lai I-J, concurring). 
335 Id. (Sun S-Y, partial concurring). 
336 Id. (Authors’ translation). 
337 Id. (Su J-H, concurring). 
338 Id. (Chen C-N, concurring and partial dissenting). 
339 Id. Reasoning ¶ 5 (Official translation). 
340 Id. (Su J-H, concurring). 
341 MINGUO XIANFA amend. (民國憲法增修條文) [Additional Articles of the 
Constitution of the Republic of China] (1999) (Taiwan). 
342 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
343 Id. 
344 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan). 
345 JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5. 
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Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] was not a single 
incident in politics.  Instead it represented the final instalment of the 
tetralogy of anti-lifelong tenure in Taiwan. 346   Although it also 
involved in the scope of judicial review (versus parliamentary 
privilege) and restraints on the constitutional amending power,347 the 
extension of the term of office348  was always the main factor.349  
Consequently, no jurist involved—apart from Justice Tseng Hua Sun, 
who submitted the only dissenting opinion350—expressed agreement 
about extending the term of office in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
499 [2000] despite disagreeing with each other regarding the 
application of due process. 351   The Chinese political tradition of 
lifelong tenure352 was (and remains) a political taboo in Taiwan, and 
no one has the power to extend any term of office for any reason in 
 
346 Compare SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI (釋字第 31號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 31] (1954), with SHIZI NO. 150 JIESHI (釋字第 150號解釋) 
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 150] (1977), SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI (釋字第 261
號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 261] (1990), and SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (
釋字第 499號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000). 
347 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2. 
348 MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan); MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 4 
(1999) (Taiwan). 
349 JEAN-PIERRE CABESTAN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN AND 
DEMOCRATISATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA: A MODEL OR A PRECEDENT FOR 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA?, in TAIWAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ASPECTS 
AND LIMITATIONS OF A DEVELOPMENT MODEL 221 (Robert Ash & J. Megan 
Greene eds., Routledge 2007) (indicating that “the extension of the term of the 
National Assembly was initiated by a DPP deputy (Law I-tieg), this version 
provoked immediate condemnation by most political leaders and the majority of 
the public”). 
350 SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Tseng H-S, dissenting). 
351 Compare SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499] (2000), with SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) 
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000) (Lin Y-M & Sun S-Y, partial 
concurring), SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499] (2000) (Su J-H & Lai I-J, concurring), SHIZI NO. 499 
JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000) (Chen 
C-N, concurring and partial dissenting), SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499號解釋
) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000) (Tseng H-S, dissenting), and 
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI YIJIANSHU CHAOBENDENG WENJIAN (釋字第 499 號解釋意
見書抄本等文件) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 Appendix] (2000). 
352 LIU, supra note 23, at 58 (indicating that the Chinese “traditional rule [was] 
lifetime tenure for the ruler”). 
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future, unless the country finds itself in a state of emergency once 
more.353 
 
353 Compare SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI (釋字第 31號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 31] (1954), with SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI (釋字第 261號解釋) 
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 261] (1990), and SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第
499號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000). 
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